New Delhi, August 5: In a quiet yet unmistakably pointed message, the Indian Army’s Eastern Command on Tuesday shared a vintage newspaper clipping on X (formerly Twitter), headlined in bold: “US ARMS WORTH $2 BILLION SHIPPED TO PAKISTAN SINCE ’54.” The timing was no coincidence.
The post came just a day after U.S. President Donald Trump accused India of indirectly financing Russia’s war in Ukraine by purchasing discounted crude and profiting from resale. The White House followed that with a 25% tariff on Indian goods, threatening further “substantial hikes.” India dismissed the accusations as “unjustified and unreasonable.”
The Army’s post didn’t name names, but its message was clear—a historical reminder of a different kind of American partnership, one that sought to derail India’s efforts during the 1971 war with Pakistan.
#IndianArmy#EasternCommand#VijayVarsh #LiberationOfBangladesh #MediaHighlights
— EasternCommand_IA (@easterncomd) August 5, 2025
"This Day That Year" Build Up of War - 05 Aug 1971 #KnowFacts.
"𝑼.𝑺 𝑨𝑹𝑴𝑺 𝑾𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑯 $2 𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑺𝑯𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑫 𝑻𝑶 𝑷𝑨𝑲𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵 𝑺𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬 '54"@adgpi@SpokespersonMoD… pic.twitter.com/wO9jiLlLQf
1971: A Chapter That Still Resonates
That year, India faced not just Pakistan’s military but the Cold War-era weight of U.S. foreign policy. The war formally began on December 3, 1971, when Pakistan launched pre-emptive strikes on Indian airfields. India responded decisively, and within 13 days, secured a historic victory with the creation of Bangladesh.
But in those two weeks, the United States, under President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, actively sided with Pakistan—despite growing reports of genocide in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). For strategic reasons rooted in Cold War rivalry and a secret opening to China, Washington prioritized Islamabad’s survival.
When the 7th Fleet Entered the Bay of Bengal
As Indian forces advanced rapidly toward Dhaka, the Nixon administration initiated a high-stakes military maneuver. On December 10, 1971, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet—Task Force 74—was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal. It was led by the USS Enterprise, the world’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, supported by helicopter carriers, missile cruisers, and destroyers.
Officially, Washington claimed the deployment was to ensure the safety of American citizens. But declassified documents and academic works such as Gary J. Bass’s The Blood Telegram make it clear that the move was aimed at pressuring India and propping up Pakistan’s collapsing military.
The goal: to intimidate New Delhi, break India’s naval blockade of East Pakistan, and force a negotiated ceasefire that could save face for Islamabad.
India Stood Firm. And So Did the Soviets.
India didn’t flinch. Just months earlier, it had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. When the USS Enterprise steamed into the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union responded with its own show of force—dispatching warships and nuclear submarines to shadow the American fleet.
According to military historians, Soviet vessels positioned themselves between U.S. warships and the Indian coastline, creating a tense but decisive naval standoff. The 7th Fleet did not escalate. India continued its operations. On December 16, Pakistani troops surrendered in Dhaka.
Had the Soviets not intervened, the American move could have changed the trajectory—or at least the cost—of the war.
The U.S. Double Game: China in the Background
While projecting strength toward India, the Nixon administration also quietly encouraged China—another Pakistani ally—to consider military action against India. According to declassified U.S. documents, Kissinger offered Beijing tacit support for intervention, while publicly assuring India of American backing in case of Chinese aggression.
In private, Kissinger told Chinese officials that Washington would oppose any interference in China’s response to the subcontinent crisis. Simultaneously, U.S. officials told India that Washington would view any Chinese hostility “gravely” and even promised “all-out help” if China acted.
This duplicity, critics argue, revealed a deeply cynical approach—maintaining backchannels with adversaries while misleading a democratic partner.
A Personal and Political Hostility
Beyond geopolitics, the 1971 U.S. stance was marked by personal animosity. Declassified White House transcripts reveal Nixon and Kissinger used racist and misogynistic language to describe Indian leaders. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s visit to Washington in November 1971, Nixon referred to Indians as “bastards,” while Kissinger infamously called Gandhi a “b*tch.”
Even U.S. diplomats who tried to raise alarms over the genocide in East Pakistan—most notably Consul General Archer Blood—were ignored, overruled, or reassigned.
Strategic Interests Trumped Morality
At the heart of U.S. support for Pakistan was a single goal: China. Yahya Khan, Pakistan’s military dictator, was the conduit for Nixon and Kissinger’s secret diplomacy to open ties with Beijing. Preserving that channel took precedence—even over credible reports of mass atrocities in East Pakistan.
India, perceived as being too close to the Soviet Union, became collateral damage in America’s Cold War calculations.
A Legacy That Shaped Bilateral Trust
The events of 1971 left a lasting imprint on India’s strategic outlook. While ties between Washington and New Delhi have grown significantly in recent decades, the memory of 1971 continues to inform India’s cautious approach to alliances and partnerships.
Tuesday’s Army post wasn’t just about history. It was about message and memory.
From Warships to Tariffs: The Pattern Persists
The Indian Army’s post landed amidst a new kind of standoff—not with fleets, but with tariffs and accusations. Trump’s administration has accused India of undermining sanctions on Russia, threatened further trade penalties, and challenged India’s sovereign energy policy.
India has pushed back forcefully. The Ministry of External Affairs noted that India’s oil imports from Russia increased only after Western countries redirected traditional supplies to Europe. The MEA also highlighted that the U.S. and EU continue to import Russian goods—ranging from uranium and palladium to chemicals—while selectively targeting India.
“In this background, the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable,” the MEA said. “Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security.”
History as Strategic Reminder
By invoking the events of 1971, the Indian Army offered more than a historical reference—it issued a quiet yet firm reminder: India’s decisions have long faced pressure from partners as well as adversaries. Then, it was the USS Enterprise. Today, it’s tariffs and trade threats. The instruments may have changed, but the challenge to India's sovereignty remains familiar.
This time, however, India isn’t just remembering. It’s resisting—with policy, with principle, and with the power of history.
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