Supreme Court says the right to vote and contest elections is not a fundamental right, overturns Rajasthan HC order

The Supreme Court of India on Friday reiterated that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right

A bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan set aside a Rajasthan High Court order that had declared several dairy cooperative bye-laws ultra vires.

The case, Ram Chandra Choudhary & Ors v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Limited and Others, centred on the validity of election bye-laws framed by District Milk Producers' Co-operative Unions in Rajasthan. These regulations, specifically Bye-law Nos. 20.1(2), 20.1(4), 20.2(7), and 20.2(9), introduced strict eligibility criteria for those seeking to contest board elections. Candidates were required to represent societies with specific audit classifications, operational continuity, and a minimum milk supply of 270 days annually.

Primary Milk Producers' Co-operative Societies originally challenged these rules in the High Court, arguing they were outside the scope of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001. While the High Court initially struck down the bye-laws, the Supreme Court has now restored them, noting that the appellants-chairpersons of five District Milk Unions-were directly affected despite not being parties to the original proceedings.

A question of statutory rights

The Court clarified the legal standing of electoral participation, emphasising that such rights "are purely statutory in nature and exist only to the extent conferred by statute". It drew a sharp distinction between the "right to vote" and the "right to contest". While Section 19 of the Act governs the right to vote, the right to seek office is subject to stricter eligibility conditions and institutional requirements.

The bench observed that the impugned bye-laws did not actually curtail the right of members to cast a vote. Instead, they focused on the qualifications required to represent a primary society on a District Union's Board of Directors. To support this, the Court cited Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal and Javed v. State of Haryana, which established that these rights remain subject to statutory controls. The Court also referenced Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik, noting that "the right to contest an election and to vote can always be restricted or abridged, if statute/rules or regulations prescribe so".

Eligibility vs disqualification

A significant portion of the judgment addressed whether these rules were "disqualifications" or "eligibility criteria". The High Court had erroneously treated them as disqualifications, but the Supreme Court found they were "threshold conditions governing entry into the electoral arena".

Unlike disqualifications under Section 28 of the Act-which act as disabilities like insolvency or conflict of interest-these bye-laws were positive, performance-oriented requirements. Criteria such as minimum milk supply and audit ratings ensure that only "active and functional member-societies participate in governance". The Court held that these norms were legally traceable to Section 8 and Schedule B of the Act, which allow societies to frame bye-laws regarding the utilisation of services and the sending of representatives.

High Court jurisdiction and procedural lapses

The Supreme Court further criticised the High Court for entertaining the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in the first place. It ruled that dairy cooperatives are autonomous bodies and do not qualify as the "State" under Article 12. Citing Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas, the bench noted that mere regulatory control by a statute does not make a private entity amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Act provides an "efficacious alternate statutory remedy" through the Registrar and arbitration under Sections 58 and 60, which the original petitioners failed to exhaust. The Court relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reiterating that when a statute provides a complete machinery for redressal, that path must be followed.

Finally, the bench highlighted a procedural failure: the High Court had struck down bye-laws for all unions in the state without hearing all affected parties. Citing Dattatreya v. Mahaveer, the Court stated that rendering a "judgment in rem" without impleading necessary parties violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment entirely.