Centre’s Proposed Bills on Arrested Ministers Spark Constitutional Debate

Emphasising probity in public life as the guiding principle, Union Home Minister Amit Shah defended in Parliament the government’s move to introduce three new bills aimed at disqualifying the Prime Minister, chief ministers, and ministers who remain under arrest for more than 30 days on serious charges. Shah underscored his point by recalling his own resignation as Gujarat Home Minister in 2010, prior to his arrest by the CBI in the Sohrabuddin Sheikh case. His remarks came in sharp rebuttal to Congress leader K.C. Venugopal, who had inaccurately claimed that Shah had not stepped down at the time.

While Shah framed the proposals as a matter of integrity in governance, political observers note that the immediate trigger was Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal’s refusal to resign during his months-long incarceration. Kejriwal eventually resigned after securing bail, only to face defeat in the subsequent Delhi Assembly polls.

The draft bills, now referred to a parliamentary committee, stipulate that any Prime Minister, Chief Minister, or minister who fails to secure bail in a serious criminal case within 30 days would automatically cease to hold office. Reinstatement would be possible upon the grant of bail. However, this provision appears to diverge from the Supreme Court’s recent stance in the case of Tamil Nadu minister Senthil Balaji, where the Court made it clear that remaining in office while on bail could compromise judicial integrity. “You have to choose between a post and freedom,” the Bench observed, prompting Balaji’s resignation.

Precedents already exist. When the Enforcement Directorate arrested Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren last year, he resigned shortly before his arrest but resumed office six months later after obtaining bail. The Centre argues that the proposed legislation is designed to create a uniform legal framework, preventing politicians from arbitrarily deciding whether or not to vacate office while under detention.

Yet, formidable hurdles remain. Opposition parties have signalled their intent to resist the bills in committee deliberations, Parliament, and the courts. Their key contention is twofold: that the government could misuse investigative agencies like the ED and CBI to destabilise opposition-led states, and that the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” is being undermined. Legal experts warn that forcing an elected leader to step down without conviction could raise significant constitutional challenges.

The government, on its part, argues that governance cannot function effectively when constitutional office-bearers are behind bars, pointing to the administrative paralysis in Delhi during Kejriwal’s imprisonment. Even so, shepherding the bills through the legislative process is likely to be protracted. Joint Parliamentary Committee deliberations are often lengthy—as seen with the Waqf Amendment Bill and the “One Nation, One Election” proposal—and constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in Parliament, a formidable task in the current political climate.

If enacted, the legislation would represent one of the most significant anti-corruption reforms in recent political history—second only to the Supreme Court’s landmark 2013 ruling disqualifying MPs and MLAs convicted with a minimum two-year sentence. That judgment, which the then-UPA government unsuccessfully sought to overturn by ordinance, barred leaders such as Lalu Prasad Yadav from contesting elections after conviction in the fodder scam.

The Centre’s initiative, therefore, sets the stage for a high-stakes battle—legislative, legal, and political—over the balance between probity in public life and the constitutional safeguards of due process.